Knowing How and Learning How: An Epistemic Theory of Control (w/ T. Kearl)
Forthcoming with Cambridge University Press.
Epistemology in the Subpersonal Vale (w/ R. Rupert).
Forthcoming with Oxford University Press: New York.
A Telic Theory of Trust
2024. Oxford: Oxford University Press. OUP page
Stratified Virtue Epistemology: A Defence
2023. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CUP page
Digital Knowledge
2023. London: Routledge. Routledge page
Autonomous Knowledge
2022. Oxford: Oxford University Press. OUP page Reviewed here (by L. Olin) and here (by C. Tweedt).
This is Epistemology (w/ C. Littlejohn).
2021. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell. Wiley-Blackwell page
The Philosophy of Group Polarization: Epistemology, Metaphysics, Psychology (w/ F. Broncano-Berrocal).
2021. London: Routledge. Routledge page
A Critical Introduction to Knowledge-How (w/ T. Poston).
2018. London: Continuum. Bloomsbury page
Metaepistemology and Relativism
2016. Palgrave MacMillan. PDF | Amazon
Edited Books
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Disagreement (w/ M. Baghramian and R. Cosker-Rowland)
Forthcoming 2024. Routledge. Introduction
The Epistemology of Group Disagreement (w/ F. Broncano-Berrocal)
2021. Routledge. ISBN 9780367077426
Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation (w/ P. Bondy)
2019. Routledge. ISBN 9781138503755
Socially Extended Epistemology (w/ A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, & D. Pritchard)
2018. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198801764
Extended Epistemology (w/ A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S.O. Palermos, & D. Pritchard)
2018. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780198769811
Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind (w/ E.C. Gordon & B.W. Jarvis)
2017. Oxford: Oxford University Press: ISBN 9780198716310
The Moral Psychology of Pride (w/ E.C. Gordon)
2017. London: Rowman and Littlefield. ISBN 9781783489084
Journal Articles
Easy Practical Knowledge (w/ T. Kearl)
Forthcoming. Journal of Philosophy. (PDF)
Abduction, Skepticism, and Indirect Realism
Forthcoming. Philosophical Studies. (PDF)
Fake Knowledge-How (w/ J. Navarro)
Forthcoming. Philosophical Quarterly. (PDF)
Frege on the Tolerability of Sense Variation: A Reply to Michaelson and Textor (w/ B. Pickel)
Forthcoming. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (PDF)
Intentional Action, Knowledge, and Cognitive Extension (w/ G. Andrada)
Forthcoming. Synthese. Draft
Safety and Dream Scepticism in Sosa's Epistemology (w/ R. Cowan)
Forthcoming. Synthese. (PDF)
Can A.I. Believe? (w/ O. Piedrahita)
2024. Philosophy and Technology. 37:89 (doi: 10.1007/s13347-024-00780-6)
What the tortoise should do: a knowledge‐first virtue approach to the basing relation (with L. M. Titus)
2024. Noûs. 58(2): 456-481 (doi: 10.1111/nous.12460)
Trust and trustworthiness
2023. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 107(2): 377-394. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12918)
Knowledge, practical knowledge, and intentional action (with J. Shepherd)
2023. Ergo. 9: 556-583.
(doi: 10.3998/ergo.2277)
Intentional action and knowledge-centred theories of control (with J. Shepherd)
2023. Philosophical Studies. 180(3): 957-977.
(doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01904-4)
Simion and Kelp on trustworthy AI
2023. Asian Journal of Philosophy. 2(1): 18.
(doi: 10.1007/s44204-023-00067-1)
Trust, distrust, and testimonial injustice (with D. Meehan)
2023. Educational Philosophy and Theory. 55(3): 290-300.
(doi: 10.1080/00131857.2022.2037418)
How to be an infallibilist (with C. Kelp and M. Simion)
2022. Philosophical Studies. 179(8): 2675-2682.
(doi: 10.1007/s11098-022-01785-7)
On some intracranialist dogmas in epistemology
2022. Asian Journal of Philosophy. 1(2): 44.
(doi: 10.1007/s44204-022-00045-z)
Trust as performance
2022. Philosophical Issues. 32(1): 120-147.
(doi: 10.1111/phis.12214)
Refitting the mirrors: on structural analogies in epistemology and action theory (with L. Miracchi)
2022. Synthese. 200: 1-28.
(doi: 10.1007/s11229-022-03462-y)
Technologically scaffolded atypical cognition: the case of YouTube’s recommender system (with M. Alfano, A. E. Fard, P. Clutton, and C. Klein)
2021. Synthese. 199(1-2): 835-858.
(doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02724-x)
Understanding a communicated thought (with E. Gordon and J.P. Grodniewicz)
2021. Synthese. 198(12): 12137-12151.
(doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02854-2)
Absolutism, relativism and metaepistemology (with R. McKenna)
2021. Erkenntnis. 86(5): 1139-1159.
(doi: 10.1007/s10670-019-00147-w)
Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale (with R. D. Rupert)
2021. Synthese. 198(10): 9243-9272.
(doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02631-1)
Introduction to Special Issue: Scepticism and Epistemic Angst (with G. Dechauffour and G. Lefftz)
2021. Synthese. 198(15): 3517-3519.
(doi: 10.1007/s11229-021-03241-1)
Educating for intellectual virtue: a critique from action guidance (with B. Kotzee and H. Siegel)
2021. Episteme. 18(2): 177-199.
(doi: 10.1017/epi.2019.10)
Sosa on knowledge, judgment and guessing
2020. Synthese. 197(12): 5117-5136.
(doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1181-2)
Varieties of cognitive integration (with J. Kallestrup)
2020. Noûs. 54(4): 867-890.
(doi: 10.1111/nous.12288)
On behalf of a bi-level account of trust
2020. Philosophical Studies. 177: 2299-2322.
(doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01311-2)
Skepticism motivated: on the skeptical import of motivated reasoning (with R. McKenna)
2020. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 50(6): 702-718.
(doi: 10.1017/can.2020.16)
The philosophy of memory technologies: metaphysics, knowledge, and values (with R. Heersmink)
2020. Memory Studies. 13(4): 416-433.
(doi: 10.1177/1750698017703810)
Introduction to Special Issue: Knowledge, Virtue and Action (w/ C. Mi, O. Palermos & D. Pritchard)
2020. Synthese. 197(6): 2291-2294.
(doi: 10.1007/s11229-020-02662-8)
Cognitive goods, open futures and the epistemology of education
2020. Journal of Philosophy of Education. 54(2): 449-466.
(doi: 10.1111/1467-9752.12420)
Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem
2020. Philosophical Studies. 177(5): 1229-1254.
(doi: 10.1007/s11098-019-01243-x)
Kornblith versus Sosa on grades of knowledge (with R. McKenna)
2019. Synthese. 196(12): 4989-5007.
(doi: 10.1007/s11229-018-1689-8)
Knowledge-how, understanding-why, and epistemic luck: an experimental study (with D. Pritchard and J. Shepherd)
2019. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 10(4): 701-734.
(doi: 10.1007/s13164-018-0429-9)
Vices of distrust (with D. Meehan)
2019. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. 8(10): 25-32.
Radical scepticism and the epistemology of confusion
2019. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. 9(3): 223-237.
10.1163/22105700-20191387)
(Anti)-anti-intellectualism and the sufficiency thesis (with B. Czarnecki)
2017. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 98(S1): 374-397. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12187)
The defeasibility of knowledge-how (with J. Navarro)
2017. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 95(3): 662-685. (doi: 10.1111/phpr.12441)
Semantic inferentialism as (a form of) active externalism (with A. Carter and J. H. Collin)
2017. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 16(3): 387-402. (doi: 10.1007/s11097-016-9458-y)
The modal account of luck revisited (with M. Peterson)
2017. Synthese. 194(6): 2175-2184. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-016-1047-7)
Googled assertion (with E. C. Gordon)
2017. Philosophical Psychology. 30(4): 490-501. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2017.1285395)
On epistemic consequentialism and the virtue conflation problem (with I. M. Church)
2016. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 5(4): 239-248. (doi: 10.1002/tht3.218)
Not knowing a cat is a cat: analyticity and knowledge ascriptions (with M. Peterson and B. van Bezooijen)
2016. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. 7(4): 817-834. (doi: 10.1007/s13164-015-0279-7)
Belief without credence (with B. W. Jarvis and K. Rubin)
2016. Synthese. 193(8): 2323-2351. (doi: 10.1007/s11229-015-0846-6)
Extended cognition and propositional memory (with J. Kallestrup)
2016. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 92(3): 691-714.
(doi: 10.1111/phpr.12157)
On the epistemology of the precautionary principle: reply to Steglich-Petersen (with M. Peterson)
2016. Erkenntnis. 81(2): 297-304. (doi: 10.1007/s10670-015-9740-3)
Group peer disagreement
2016. Ratio. 29(1): 11-28. (doi: 10.1111/rati.12077)
Robust virtue epistemology as anti-luck epistemology: a new solution
2016. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. 97(1): 140-155. (doi: 10.1111/papq.12040)
Is having your computer compromised a personal assault? The ethics of extended cognition (with S. O. Palermos)
2016. Journal of the American Philosophical Association. 2(4): 542-560. (doi: 10.1017/apa.2016.28)
Knowledge, assertion and intellectual humility (with E. C. Gordon)
2016. Logos and Episteme. 7(4): 489-502. (doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme20167444)
Extended emotion (with E. C. Gordon and S. O. Palermos)
2016. Philosophical Psychology. 29(2): 198-217. (doi: 10.1080/09515089.2015.1063596)
Richard Rorty and epistemic normativity (with E. T. Kerr)
2016. Social Epistemology. 30(1): 3-24. (doi: 10.1080/02691728.2014.971914)
Knowledge-how and epistemic value (with D. Pritchard)
2015. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 93(4): 799-816.
(doi: 10.1080/00048402.2014.997767)
Knowledge-how and epistemic luck (with D. Pritchard)
2015. Noûs. 49(3): 440-453.
(doi: 10.1111/nous.12054)
Knowledge-how and cognitive achievement (with D. Pritchard)
2015. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 91(1): 181-199.
(doi: 10.1111/phpr.12094)
Varieties of cognitive achievement (with B. W. Jarvis and K. Rubin)
2015. Philosophical Studies. 172(6): 1603-1623.
(doi: 10.1007/s11098-014-0367-z)
On cognitive and moral enhancement: a reply to Savulescu and Persson (with E. C. Gordon)
2015. Bioethics. 29(3): 153-161.
(doi: 10.1111/bioe.12076)
On the epistemology of the precautionary principle (with M. Peterson)
2015. Erkenntnis. 80(1): 1-13.
(doi: 10.1007/s10670-014-9609-x)
Intelligence, wellbeing and procreative beneficence (with E. C. Gordon)
2013. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 30(2): 122-135.
(doi: 10.1111/japp.12011)
A problem for Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology
2013. Erkenntnis. 78(2): 253-275.
(doi: 10.1007/s10670-011-9315-x)
Varieties of cognitive achievement (with B. Jarvis and K. Rubin)
2013. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 91(2): 249-263.
(doi: 10.1080/00048402.2012.694455)
Against swamping (with B. Jarvis)
2012. Analysis. 72(4): 690-699.
(doi: 10.1093/analys/ans118)
Is epistemic expressivism incompatible with inquiry? (with M. Chrisman)
2012. Philosophical Studies. 159(3): 323-339.
(doi: 10.1007/s11098-011-9710-9)
On Stanley’s intellectualism
2012. International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 20(5): 749-762.
(doi: 10.1080/09672559.2012.741820)
Recent work on Moore’s proof
2012. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. 2(2): 115-144.
(doi: 10.1163/221057011X560974)
Norms of assertion: the quantity and quality of epistemic support
2011. Philosophia. 39(4): 615-635.
(doi: 10.1007/s11406-011-9317-6)
Kvanvig on pointless truths and the cognitive ideal
2011. Acta Analytica. 26(3): 285-293.
(doi: 10.1007/s12136-010-0114-9)
Radical skepticism, closure, and robust knowledge
2011. Journal of Philosophical Research. 36: 115-133.
(doi: 10.5840/jpr_2011_2)
Just the right thickness: a defense of second-wave virtue epistemology (with G. Axtell)
2008. Philosophical Papers. 37(3): 413-434.
(doi: 10.1080/05568640809485229)
Book Chapters
Knowledge Norms and Conversation
Forthcoming. Epistemology of Conversation, (ed.) Waldomiro J. Silva Filho (Dordrecht, Springer).
PDF
Analysis of Knowledge
Forthcoming. Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, (ed.) K. Sylvan.
PDF
Understanding, vulnerability and risk
2023. In: González-Castán, Ó.L. (ed.) Cognitive Vulnerability: An Epistemological Approach. Berlin studies in knowledge research, 18. De Gruyter: Berlin, pp. 177-192.
ISBN 9783110799163 (doi: 10.1515/9783110799163-011)
Intuitions (with J. J. Ichikawa)
2023. In: Oxford Bibliographies Online. Oxford University Press. (In Press)
Reply to critics: collective (telic) virtue epistemology
2022. In: Alfano, M., Klein, C. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 363-366.
ISBN 9780367808952 (doi: 10.4324/9780367808952-48)
Reply to Gardiner on virtues of attention
2022. In: Alfano, M., Klein, C. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 73-76.
ISBN 9780367808952 (doi: 10.4324/9780367808952-8)
Reply to Watson on the social virtue of questioning
2022. In: Alfano, M., Klein, C. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge, pp. 442-444.
ISBN 9780367808952 (doi: 10.4324/9780367808952-58)
Epistemic normativity is not independent of our goals
2022. In: Sosa, E., Steup, M., Turri, J. and Roeber, B. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd Edition. Wiley-Blackwell. (Accepted for Publication)
On behalf of knowledge-first collective epistemology (with M. Simion and C. Kelp)
2022. In: Silva, P. and Oliveira, L. R.G. (eds.) Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. Routledge.
ISBN 9781003008101 (doi: 10.4324/9781003008101-15)
Collateral conflicts and epistemic norms
2021. In: McCain, K., Stapleford, S. and Steup, M. (eds.) Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.
ISBN 9781003134565 (doi: 10.4324/9781003134565-5)
Politics, deep disagreement, and relativism
2021. In: Hannon, M. and de Ridder, J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. Routledge.
ISBN 9780367345907
Trust and its significance in social epistemology
2021. In: Lackey, J. and McGlynn, A. (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. (In Press)
The epistemology of group disagreement: an introduction (with F. Broncano-Berrocal)
2020. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 1-8.
ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-1)
Deliberation and group disagreement (with F. Broncano-Berrocal)
2020. In: Broncano-Berrocal, F. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge: New York, NY, pp. 9-45.
ISBN 9780367077426 (doi: 10.4324/9780429022500-2)
Intellectual humility and assertion (with E. C. Gordon)
2020. In: Alfano, M., Lynch, M. P. and Tanesini, A. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Humility. Routledge: Oxon, UK, pp. 335-345.
ISBN 9780815364115
Collective (telic) virtue epistemology
2020. In: Alfano, M., de Ridder, J. and Klein, C. (eds.) Social Virtue Epistemology. Routledge: London. (Accepted for Publication)
Is searching the internet making us intellectually arrogant? (with E. Gordon)
2020. In: Tanesini, A. and Lynch, M. P. (eds.) Polarisation, Arrogance, and Dogmatism: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge, pp. 88-103.
ISBN 9780367260859 (doi: 10.4324/9780429291395-9)
Epistemic autonomy and externalism
2020. In: Lougheed, K. and Matheson, J. (eds.) Epistemic Autonomy. Routledge: London, UK. (Accepted for Publication)
Varieties of (extended) thought manipulation
2020. In: Blitz, M. and Bublitz, C. (eds.) The Future of Freedom of Thought: Liberty, Technology, and Neuroscience. Palgrave Macmillan. (In Press)
Epistemic pluralism (with A.-K. Koch)
2020. In: Harris, P., Bitoni, A., Fleisher, C.S. and Skorkjær Binderkrantz, A. (eds.) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs. Palgrave Macmillan. (Accepted for Publication)
Higher-order defeat in collective moral epistemology
2020. In: Klenk, M. (ed.) Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. Routledge: New York.
ISBN 9780367343200
The superstitious lawyer's inference (with P. Bondy)
2019. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge.
ISBN 9781138503755
Well-founded belief: an introduction (with P. Bondy)
2019. In: Bondy, P. and Carter, J. A. (eds.) Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. Routledge.
ISBN 9781138503755
Relativism and externalism (with R. McKenna)
2019. In: Kusch, M. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism. Routledge: London.
ISBN 9781138484283
Epistemic luck and the extended mind
2019. In: Church, I. M. and Hartman, R. J. (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of The Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. Routledge: New York, pp. 318-319.
ISBN 9780815366591
Virtue perspectivism, externalism, and epistemic circularity
2019. In: Crețu, A.-M. and Massimi, M. (eds.) Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Synthese library (Studies in epistemology, logic, methodology, and philosophy of science), 416. Springer: Cham, pp. 123-140.
ISBN 9783030270407 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-27041-4_8)
Extended self-knowledge (with D. Pritchard)
2018. In: Pedrini, P. and Kirsch, J. (eds.) Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative. Contributions to phenomenology (96). Springer: Cham, pp. 31-49.
ISBN 9783319986449 (doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_3)
New humans? Ethics, trust, and the extended mind (with A. Clark and S. O. Palermos)
2018. In: Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 331-351.
ISBN 9780198769811
Extended circularity: a new puzzle for extended cognition (with J. Kallestrup)
2018. In: Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 42-63.
ISBN 9780198769811
Epistemic Pluralism, Epistemic Relativism and 'Hinge' Epistemology
2017. In: Coliva, A. and Pedersen, N. J.L.L. (eds.) Epistemic Pluralism. Palgrave innovations in philosophy. Palgrave, pp. 229-252. ISBN 9783319654591
Knowledge-First: An Introduction (with E. C. Gordon and B. W. Jarvis)
2017. In: Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C., and Jarvis, B. W. (eds.) Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK, pp. 1-18. ISBN 9780198716310
(doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198716310.003.0001)
Cognitive Bias, Scepticism and Understanding (with D. Pritchard)
2017. In: Grimm, S. R., Baumberger, C., and Ammon, S. (eds.) Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Routledge: New York, pp. 272-292. ISBN 9781138921931
The Moral Psychology of Pride: An Introduction (with E. C. Gordon)
2017. In: Carter, J. A. and Gordon, E. C. (eds.) The Moral Psychology of Pride. Moral psychology of the emotions. Rowan & Liitlefield: London, UK, pp. 1-11. ISBN 9781783489084
Are Theism and Atheism Totally Opposed? Can They Learn from Each Other?
2017. In: Harris, M. and Pritchard, D. (eds.) Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone. Routledge: New York, pp. 82-92. ISBN 9781138234215
Epistemological Implications of Relativism
2017. In: Ichikawa, J. J. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. Taylor and Francis, pp. 292-301. ISBN 9781138818392
Epistemic Luck (with F. Broncano-Berrocal)
2017. In: Crane, T. (ed.) Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Taylor and Francis.
Inference to the Best Explanation and Epistemic Circularity (with D. Pritchard)
2017. In: McCain, K. and Poston, T. (eds.) Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation. Oxford University Press: Oxford. ISBN 9780198746904
Objectual Understanding, Factivity and Belief (with E. C. Gordon)
2016. In: Grajner, M. and Schmechtig, P. (eds.) Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter, pp. 423-442. ISBN 9783110496345
Intellectual Humility, Knowledge-How, and Disagreement (with D. Pritchard)
2016. In: Mi, C., Slote, M., and Sosa, E. (eds.) Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. Routledge: New York, pp. 49-63. ISBN 9781138925168
Epistemology and Active Externalism (with S. O. Palermos)
2015. In: Oxford Bibligraphies Online: Philosphy. Oxford University Press. (doi: 10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0285)
Book Reviews
Epistemic Values: Collected Papers in Epistemology (2022)
Carter, J. A. Philosophical Review, 131(2), pp. 235-240. DOI: 10.1215/00318108-9554769 [Book Review]
Review of Epistemology by Ernest Sosa (2017)
Carter, A. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2017, [Book Review]
MOOCS, by Jonathan Haber (2015)
Carter, J. A. and Pritchard, D. Teaching Philosophy, 38(4), pp. 455-458. [Book Review]
Review of Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard (Eds) Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Essays on Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work (2014)
Carter, J. A. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2014, [Book Review]
Faulkner, Paul, Knowledge on Trust (2013)
Carter, J. A. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 91(2), pp. 409-413. DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2013.775169 [Book Review]
The Inquiring Mind: On Intellectual Virtues and Virtue Epistemology (2013)
Carter, J. A. Philosophical Quarterly, 63(250), pp. 184-187. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00096.x [Book Review]
Review of E. Sosa's "Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge," Volumes I and II (2010)
Carter, J. A. ProtoSociology, [Book Review]
On Cappelen and Hawthorne's "Relativism and Monadic Truth" (2009)
Carter, J. A. ProtoSociology, [Book Review]
Reference Articles
Metaepistemology (with E. Sosa)
2022. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Value of Knowledge (with D. Pritchard and J. Turri)
2022. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Relativism (with M. Baghramian)
2021. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust (with M. Simion)
2020. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Epistemology and Relativism
2016. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Edited Journal Special Issues
Special Issue (Book Symposium) on Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge (with Kelp, C. Kelp and M. Simion)
2022. Philosophical Studies, 179(8)
Special Issue (Book Symposium) on Jessica Brown's Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge
Carter, J. A., Kelp, C., and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2022) Philosophical Studies. 179(8) [Edited Journal]
Epistemology
Carter, J. A., Gordon, E. C., Kelp, C., Lyons, J. C., and Simion, M. (Eds.) (2021) Philosophical Topics. 49(2) [Edited Journal]
Extended Knowledge
Carter, J. A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O., and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) (2014) Philosophical Issues. 24(1) [Edited Journal]
Special Issue of Synthese: Scepticism and Epistemic Angst [Guest Editors] (2019)
Carter, J. A., Leffetz, G., and Dechauffour, G. (Eds.) Springer. (In Press)
Special Issue of Synthese: Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Eastern and Western Perspectives [Guest Editors] (2020)
Carter, J. A., Mi, C., Palermos, S. O., and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) Springer. ISBN 0039-7857
Special Issue of American Philosophical Quarterly: Varieties of Externalism: Epistemic, Content, Vehicle [Guest Editors] (2016)
Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O., and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) University of Illinois Press.
Special Issue of Logos and Episteme: Intellectual Humility [Guest Editors] (2016)
Carter, J. A., Kallestrup, J., and Palermos, S. O. (Eds.) Institute for Economic and Social Research of The Romanian Academy.